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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2A-10/10/84 
In the Matter of 






CASE NO. U-7544 
MADELON HAFFNER. pro s_e 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Madelon 
Haffner to a decision of the Acting Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Acting Director) 
dismissing her charge against the Hauppauge Schools Office 
Staff Association (Association). The charge alleged that the 
Association violated its duty of fair representation by not 
taking her grievance which complained that the Hauppauge Union 
Free School District (District) improperly passed her over for 
promotion to the position of senior stenographer. The Acting 
Director dismissed the charge on the ground that the facts, as 
alleged, do not. as a matter of law. constitute a violation of 
the Taylor Law. 
Haffner alleges that the collective bargaining agreement 
between the Association and the District provides that 
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promotions shall be granted on the basis of ability, seniority 
and qualifications to perform the job efficiently and that 
qualified employees in the classification immediately below the 
one in which the opening occurs should be given priority over 
other employees. She alleges that she was senior to Wall, the 
employee who received the promotion which she sought, and that 
she held the position in the classification immediately below 
that of senior stenographer, while Wall held a position in a 
lower classification. Dealing with the contractual reference 
to ability and qualifications, she alleges that hers were at 
least as good as those of Wall. In support of this 
proposition, she alleges that the senior stenographer position 
is in the competitive Civil Service and that her grade in the 
relevant Civil Service examination was higher than Wall's. 
Finally, Haffner alleges that when she first complained to the 
Association, its executive board voted unanimously in support 
of the proposition that the promotion of Wall was a "gross 
inequity" to her. This, according to Haffner, establishes that 
the District's decision to promote Wall constituted a clear 
violation of its collective bargaining agreement with the 
Association and that the Association's executive board agreed 
with this analysis. 
Thereafter, according to Haffner. a committee of the 
Association met with the District's personnel administrator, 
and when the personnel administrator stood by his earlier 
action, the executive committee voted to take no further 
*r G3"Q7 
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action. This, Haffner complains, constituted irresponsible 
conduct by the Association. 
We find that upon the facts alleged by Haffner, the 
Association's failure to file a grievance on her behalf and to 
represent her in that grievance may constitute a violation of 
its statutory duty of fair representation. 
ACCORDINGLY, WE REVERSE the decision of the Acting 
Director dismissing the charge, and 
WE ORDER that this matter be remanded to the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation for further proceedings 
consistent herewith. 
DATED: October 10, 1984 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
David C. Randies. Member/ 
ncMm 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, INC. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7449 
THOMAS C. BARRY. 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, INC. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7482 
THOMAS C. BARRY. 
Charging Party. 
BERNARD F. ASHE. ESQ. (IVOR MOSKOWITZ. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
THOMAS C. BARRY, pro. se 
SUPPLEMENTARY DECISION 
Thomas C. Barry filed a charge in Case U-7449 on April 20. 
1984. It alleged that United University Professions, Inc. 
(UUP) violated the Taylor Law by using part of his agency shop 
fee payments to support a political candidacy. The Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) ruled 
that the Taylor Law does not preclude a union from using agency 
shop fee monies in support of political objectives so long as 
the pro rata share of such expenditures is refunded to 
Board - U-7449/U-7482 -2 
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nonunion members who make objections to such expenditures. 
Accordingly, on April 27, 1984, without serving a copy of the 
charge on UUP, he dismissed it on the ground that it did not 
set forth a violation of the Taylor Law. 
Two days before the Director's decision, the U.S. Supreme 
Court issued its decision in Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway. 
Airline and Steamship Clerks, U.S. . 17 PERB 1f7511 
(1984). It holds, inter alia, that a "pure rebate approach is 
inadequate". In his exceptions to the decision of the 
Director, Barry argued that the refund procedure found 
acceptable by the Director was a "pure rebate approach" such as 
was found "inadequate" in Ellis. 
. Subsequent to the decision of the Ellis case, Barry filed 
a second charge (U-7482) against UUP in which he made the same 
complaint that he had made in his earlier charge. The Director 
ruled that, by reason of his dismissal of the first charge, the 
second charge was res judicata. Recognizing that his 
interpretation of the Taylor Law. which was based upon our 
decision in UUP (Eson). 11 PERB f3074 (1978). might leave the 
statute unconstitutional, in the light of Ellis, he ruled that 
"the legality of the provision of the Act is beyond this 
agency's authority." Accordingly, on May 21. 1984. he 
dismissed this charge, too, without serving a copy of it on 
UUP, on the ground that it did not set forth a violation of the 
Taylor Law. 
- $310 
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We consolidated Barry's exceptions in both these matters 
and issued an interim decision on June 26. 1984. In that 
decision, we decided to reexamine the correctness of our 
interpretation of the Taylor Law in UUP (Eson) as sanctioning 
UUP's refund procedure. Accordingly, we invited Barry and UUP 
to submit memoranda of law concerning the correctness of our 
decision in UUP (Eson). and what alternative procedures, if 
any, might be required to satisfy the statute. Both did so. 
Moreover, UUP's memorandum addressed the merits of the charges 
and denied any violation of the Taylor Law. 
On the basis of those memoranda, our own reading of the 
Taylor Law, the Ellis decision and relevant lower court 
decisions issued since Ellis, we issued a decision at our last 
meeting, on September 19, 1984 (17 PERB 1f3098). We reached a 
conclusion of law that our decision in UUP (Eson) should be 
overruled. We then addressed the merits of Barry's two charges 
and UUP's denial of a violation. Finding a violation, we 
issued a remedial order. 
Upon reconsideration, on our own motion, we now determine 
that, while our overruling of UUP (Eson) was appropriate, we 
acted prematurely insofar as we addressed the merits of the 
charges, found a violation and issued a remedial order. We now 
believe that, notwithstanding UUP's addressing the merits of 
the charge in its memorandum of law. it had not been given an 
opportunity to file an answer to the charges and to present 
material evidence in support of any allegations that might be 
/ 
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contained in that answer. Accordingly, we withdraw so much of 
the decision of September 19. 1984 (17 PERB 1f3098) as addressed 
the merits of the charges, finds a violation and issues a 
remedial order. 
UUP is hereby given ten working days from receipt of this 
decision to file and serve its answer to the two charges. The 
merits of the charges shall then be considered by an 
Administrative Law Judge assigned by the Director. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that our order in U-7449 and 
U-7482 be, and it hereby is, withdrawn; 
and that the consolidated matters be, and 
they hereby are, remanded to the Director 
for further proceedings consistent 
herewith. 
DATED: October 9, 1984 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
W ^ ^ 
David C. Randies,\ Member 
0/110 n f. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#20-10/10/84 
In the Matter of the Petition of the 
SYRACUSE HANCOCK PROFESSIONAL FIRE CASE NO. 1-0033 
FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION. 
to review the implementation of the 
provisions and procedures enacted by 
the Syracuse City Public Employment 
Relations Board pursuant to §212 of 
the Civil Service Law. 
LOMBARDI, REINHARD. WALSH & HARRISON. P.C. (RICHARD P. 
WALSH. JR., ESQ., and MICHAEL T. MCGARRY. ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Petitioner. 
BOND, SCHOENECK & KING. (STEPHEN J. VOLLMER. ESQ.. and 
JOHN GAAL, Esq., of Counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the petition of the Syracuse 
Hancock Professional Fire Fighters Association (Association) 
seeking review, pursuant to Civil Service Law §212 (CSL). of 
whether the determination of the Syracuse City Public 
Employment Relations Board (Syracuse PERB) complies with the 
requirement that its procedures and their "continuing 
implementation" be "substantially equivalent" to the 
provisions and procedures governing this Board. 
-,- 9313 
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On February 3. 1984.— the Association filed a 
petition seeking review of a determination made by the 
Syracuse PERB dated November 30. 1983, which, in substance, 
determined that the Airport Crash Rescue Unit of the 
Syracuse Department of Aviation is not a "fire department" 
within the contemplation of CSL §209.4. so as to warrant the 
application of the compulsory arbitration provisions of that 
section after an impasse. 
In 1969 the Syracuse Fire Department ceased maintaining 
a fire station at the Hancock Airport. At the same time the 
City's Department of Aviation undertook responsibility for 
crash rescue operations at the airport. The County Civil 
Service Department (County CSD) approved the creation of a 
series of "rescue" worker titles distinct from the 
classification of "fire fighters". All employees of the 
Rescue Unit must qualify by passing a specially designed 
examination administered by the County CSD. 
The petitioner claims that the Syracuse PERB. in 
reaching its conclusions, failed to implement the local 
procedures in a manner substantially equivalent to those 
^Requests for time within which to submit a position 
statement by the intervener and a reply brief by 
petitioner, as well as the need to investigate and 
ascertain the background and position of the Syracuse PERB, 
account for the time required for the issuance of this 
decision. 
Board - 1-0033 -3 
applicable to the State PERB and also that such findings 
"were factually in/serror resulting in subsequent erroneous 
conclusions." In support of this claim, petitioner notes 
that prior to 1969. the City Charter provided that no one 
but the "Department of Fire shall have a fire force." By 
amendment in 1968. an exception was added to this 
prohibition and contemporaneously the responsibilities of 
the Syracuse Aviation Department were expanded to include "a 
crash rescue and firefighting force for purposes of 
providing fire protection and firefighting operations" 
affecting all aviation facilities of the City. While 
petitioner admits that all firefighters formerly assigned to 
the airport were returned to the City, it emphasizes that 
the requirements for applicants for crash rescue positions 
included "two years" experience in an organized professional 
fire department." This, it asserts, makes firefighters of 
the rescue workers. 
The Syracuse PERB found that the members of petitioner 
perform aircraft crash rescue and firefighting duties, 
participate in aircraft standby operations and perform desk 
watch duties, have available four trucks built to dispense 
water and chemical foam, use aluminum suits when controlling 
blazes caused by airline crashes and fuel spills, and have 
the primary responsibility of rescuing passengers and 
mi 
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controlling fires in crashed aircraft. The findings also 
included a description of the staffing of the unit. In 
support of its conclusion, the Syracuse PERB determined that 
the petitioner's members do not have the "extensive duties of 
an organized fire department" and that burning buildings at 
the airport "are still the primary responsibility of the 
Syracuse Fire Department . . . ." 
In support of the Syracuse PERB, the intervenor. City of 
Syracuse, argues that the petition should be dismissed as 
untimely, and that in any event the decision of the Syracuse 
PERB meets the "substantially equivalent" standard. It 
argues that the "crash rescue" workers are not members of any 
organized fire department because "crash rescue" workers are 
not covered as firefighters under either the General 
Municipal Law or the Retirement and Social Security Law, and 
do not receive the benefits provided by those laws for 
firefighters. 
DISCUSSION 
At the outset, we reject the claim of the intervenor 
that the petition for review should be dismissed as 
untimely. The record discloses that the decision of the 
Syracuse PERB was dated November 30, 1983. and that the cover 
letter addressed to the attorney for petitioner was dated 
-*•- 931.6 
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December 5. 1983. The petition herein was filed on 
February 3, 1984. Other than the transmittal letter from the 
Syracuse PERB, the record contains no other evidence as to 
when the decision of the Syracuse PERB was served upon 
petitioner. The intervenor does not assert a date of 
service. We therefore accept the date of the transmittal 
letter as being the date of service and since that date is 
within the 60-day limitation of our Rules, the petition herein 
is timely. 
The basis for our review of a local board's determination 
lies in CSL §212 wherein we are empowered to ascertain whether 
provisions and procedures adopted thereunder by a local 
government "and the continuing implementations thereof are 
substantially equivalent to the provisions and procedures set 
forth" with respect to the State. In exercising this power, 
we have often recognized the desirability of permitting 
diversity among local boards, but we have also stated that a 
local board's determination will be overruled if it will 
"effectively deprive employees of the rights granted to them 
2/ by Article 14 of the Civil Service Law".— The decision 
under review herein would deny important rights to these 
employees if their status is as they claim. The decision 
2/AFSCME. Council 66. 4 PERB ir3063. at p. 3716 
(1971); see also King. 6 PERB 1P083 (1973). 
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involves an interpretation of the statute which goes to its 
essence, i.e., its coverage. In such cases, diversity must 
give way to the need for uniformity of coverage under the 
Taylor Law. We must, therefore, closely scrutinize the facts 
and determine whether the local board's decision constitutes 
a proper interpretation of the statute. 
The issue presented is not whether these employees 
perform firefighting duties but whether they are. in the 
words of the statute, "officers or members of any organized 
fire department...of any...city..." (Civil Service Law 
§209.4). This question is comparable to that considered by 
this Board in Erie County Sheriff. 7 PERB ir3057 (1974). 
There we recognized that deputy sheriffs perform the duties 
of police officers, but. nevertheless, the Sheriff's Office 
was not an "organized police force or police department" 
within the meaning of Civil Service Law §209.4. 
In this case, there is considerable doubt whether these 
airport crash rescue workers are the equivalent of 
"firefighters" as that term is generally understood. While 
they are undoubtedly called upon, as part of their duties, to 
fight aircraft fires, their general duties are related to the 
safety of operation of the airport. They are not primarily 
responsible for fighting building fires at the airport, as 
this duty ultimately resides with the Syracuse Fire 
Department. Their positions do not have the Civil Service 
title of "firefighter". They are not eligible for coverage 
Board - 1-0033 -7 
under Article 8 of the Retirement and Social Security Law -
the New York State Policemen's and Firemen's Retirement 
System. 
Of more importance, in our view, is the fact that this 
airport crash and rescue operation is under the aegis of the 
Syracuse Department of Aviation, not the Syracuse Fire 
Department. The full range of responsibilities of the 
Syracuse Fire Department extends to the airport and its 
facilities, except that the crash and rescue unit is 
responsible for aircraft fires and other aircraft accidents 
and emergencies. While it is conceivable that a public 
employer could operate more than one "organized fire 
department", the record before us does not warrant any such 
unusual finding with respect to the operations of the City of 
Syracuse. Undoubtedly, when the airport crash and rescue 
workers are called upon to control a fire, they may be acting 
as firefighters, but that does not create another "organized 
fire department" in the City of Syracuse. 
Based upon our review of the record before us. we 
conclude that the determination of the Syracuse PERB was a 
proper interpretation of Civil Service Law §209.4. 
Accordingly, we find that the local board has implemented its 
local provisions and procedures in a manner substantially 
equivalent to that required by the Taylor Law and this 
Board's Rules of Procedure. 
Board - 1-0033 -8 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the petition be. and it 
hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: October 10, 1984 
Albany. New York 




STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF ERIE. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-753 3 
NEW YORK STATE NURSES ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
HARDER, SILBER & GILLEN, ESQS. (JEFFREY DANA GILLEN, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
New York State Nurses Association (Association) to a decision 
of the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissing its charge against the 
County of Erie (County) on the ground that the charge fails 
to allege facts that constitute a violation of a statute. 
The Association complains that the County reneged on a 
grievance settlement. It alleges that it and the County 
resolved a grievance during a second step discussion, but 
that, thereafter, the County changed its mind and refused to 
abide by the settlement. Citing St. Lawrence County. 10 PERB 
1P058 (1977), the Director dismissed the charge on the ground 
that it sought enforcement of an agreement between the County 
Board - U-7533 -2 
and the Association, and it was therefore beyond the 
jurisdiction of this Board. 
Supporting its exceptions, the Association asserts that 
this Board has jurisdiction over violations of a grievance 
settlement even though it does not have jurisdiction over 
either a violation of the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement or over the terms of an arbitration award. In 
support of this proposition, the Association makes the policy 
argument that without PERB jurisdiction, a violation of a 
grievance settlement would fall into a no-man's land. Thus, a 
grievance settlement is different from contract disputes where 
arbitration is the preferred means of resolution, and 
compliance problems, where court action is available. 
We affirm the decision of the Director. Regardless of the 
merits of the Association's policy argument,— its position 
is inconsistent with the provisions of the Taylor Law. A 
settlement of a grievance is an agreement between an employer 
and an employee organization, and §205.5(d) of the statute 
expressly states: 
[T]he Board shall not have authority to 
enforce an agreement between an employer and 
an employee organization and shall not 
exercise jurisdiction over an alleged 
violation of such an agreement . . . . 
I/There is nothing to prevent a party to a grievance 
settlement agreement from enforcing that agreement in court 
or from reasserting the grievance. 
) 
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NOW, THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be. and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: October 10, 1984 
Albany, New York 
M^m^/^^A/M 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Q9QQ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WAYNE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2766 
WAYNE CENTRAL FEDERATION OF SUPPORT 
PERSONNEL. NYSUT, AFT, AFL/CIO. 
Petitioner. 
STANTON & VANDER BYL. ESQS. (WAYNE A. VANDER BYL, 
ESQ.. of Counsel), for Employer 
MYRON GREEN, for Petitioner 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Wayne 
Central Federation of Support Personnel. NYSUT. AFT, AFL/CIO 
(Federation), to a decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing 
its petition to represent a unit of white-collar employees of 
the Wayne Central School District (District).- The 
Director dismissed the petition on the basis of his 
i/The Federation identifies white-collar employees as 
typists, aides, teaching assistants, nurses, clerks, 
couriers, cafeteria monitors and switchboard receptionist. 
J 
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2/ determination that a combined blue-— and white-collar unit 
is more appropriate than the unit sought by the 
3/ Federation.— 
Both the blue- and white-collar workers of the 
District are unorganized. The record shows no consistent 
line of distinction between the blue- and white-collar 
employees concerning their terms and conditions of 
employment. On the contrary, the differences concerning 
terms and conditions of employment that exist may be found 
within both the blue-collar and white-collar groups. 
Among these are the length of the work year and the nature 
of the fringe benefits received. While all white-collar 
employees work indoors and are paid on an annual basis. 
and some blue-collar employees work outdoors and are paid 
on an hourly basis, other blue-collar employees are 
similar to the white-collar employees in both those 
respects. There is also no evidence in the record that 
either the blue- or white-collar employees have distinct 
negotiation goals. 
2_/The District identifies blue-collar employees as 
cleaners, custodians, maintenance workers, food service 
helpers, cook managers, bus drivers and mechanics. 
l^The Federation disclaimed any interest in 
representing a unit other than that of white-collar 
employees. 
. Q99 
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Notwithstanding the fact that there is often a 
conflict of interest between blue-and white-collar 
employees, there are circumstances in which the 
distinctions between them are blurred and their 
aspirations in collective bargaining can be adequately 
. 4 / 
represented m a single negotiating unit.— Such is the 
case here. 
On the record before us, we determine that the blue-
and white-collar employees constitute a single negotiating 
unit, there being no showing that the most appropriate 
unit is anything other than the largest possible grouping 
of the District's noninstructional staff. Accordingly, we 
affirm the decision of the Director. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the petition herein be. 
and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: October 10, 1984 
Albany, New York 
Harped/R. Newman, Chairman 
ie/^A 
David C. Randies, Member 
i/Town of Smithtown, 8 PERB 1f30l5 (1975) 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF LAKE SUCCESS. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7325 
LAKE SUCCESS POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION. 
Charging Party. 
PETER R. MINEO. ESQ.. for Respondent 
SCHLACHTER & MAURO. ESQS.. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Lake 
Success Police Benevolent Association (PBA) to the decision 
of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge 
against the Incorporated Village of Lake Success (Village). 
The charge alleges that the Village refused to negotiate 
retirement benefits pursuant to a contract reopener. The 
ALJ dismissed the charge on the ground that the contract 
reopener contained in the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement was not applicable to the retirement benefits 
demanded by PBA. 
The parties' agreement contains a reopener clause. It 
provides: 
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If any provisions of this agreement shall be 
found to be illegal, the Village and the PBA 
agree to reopen the negotiation of this 
contract and to replace said illegal 
provision with another provision which is 
substantially equal in monetary value. 
The PBA alleges that the conditions for reopening negotiations 
were met in that a retirement benefit provided for in the 
parties' 1982-84 agreement was declared illegal. The benefit 
is an improvement in the 25-year retirement plan which grants 
additional retirement benefits for service in excess of 25 
years. The problem is that some — and perhaps all — of the 
police officers employed by the Village had previously 
withdrawn from the 25-year retirement plan by electing to 
participate in a special 20-year retirement plan that was 
available to them. In a case involving a former employee of 
the Village, the Appellate Division held that the improved 
25-year retirement plan is only available to police officers 
in the regular 25-year plan; police officers in the 20-year 
retirement plan are not eligible for it.— 
In dismissing the charge, the ALJ distinguished between 
the legality of the improved 25-year plan and its 
applicability to employees of the Village. He determined that 
the plan has not been found illegal but merely inapplicable to 
one or more Village employees. The PBA argues that the ALJ 
1/Ruckqaber v. Regan. 95 AD2d 892. 464 NYS2d 238 (3d 
Dept., 1983). 
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has drawn a meaningless distinction between illegality and 
inapplicability, the Appellate Division having determined 
that the improved 25-year retirment plan could not be 
legally applied to at least one police officer. 
On its face, the collective bargaining agreement 
contains a reopener, but it is unclear whether the language 
of the reopener is applicable to the circumstances herein. 
No provision of the parties' collective bargaining agreement 
has been found to be illegal. All the record shows is that 
the agreement provides a benefit for which one or more 
current employees are ineligible. We therefore find that 
PBA relies upon an ambiguous contract reopener clause. 
In the exercise of its discretion, this Board has 
decided not to interpret such an ambiguous clause of a 
collective bargaining agreement to determine whether there 
is a duty to negotiate a demand pursuant to an alleged 
2/ 
reopener clause.— The reason for our past decision is 
our understanding of the policy underlying the Taylor Law 
that parties to a collective bargaining agreement should be 
encouraged to establish their own mechanisms to resolve 
disputes involving the interpretation of their contracts. 
The same reasoning applies here. 
i/Hunter-Tannersville Teachers' Assn.. 16 PERB ir3l09 
(1983) . 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be. and 
it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: October 10. 1984 
Albany. New York 
airman 
LMM 
David C. Randies. Member 
'•AT ii'f? QQi 
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STATE OF NEW YORK #2G-10/10/84 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7293 
THOMAS C. BARRY. 
Charging Party. 
BERNARD F. ASHE. ESQ. (IVOR MOSKOWITZ. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
THOMAS C. BARRY, pro. se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Thomas C. 
Barry to the decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing his charge that United University Professions (UUP) 
violated §209-a.2(a) of the Taylor Law by not providing 
adequate notice of its agency shop fee refund procedure to unit 
employees eligible for a refund. 
UUP alleged that it provided notice in its newsletter, 
which it mailed to nonmembers. but not by first-class mail. It 
argued that this notice was sufficient. Barry did not contest 
UUP's allegations. Rather, he asserted that they were 
irrelevant because notice by anything less than first-class 
mail was inadequate. 
Assuming UUP's uncontested allegations to be true, the ALJ 
rejected Barry's legal argument, holding that delivery of the 
notice by any mail delivered by the United States Postal 
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Service in the regular course of business constitutes reasonable 
notice of the refund procedure to persons eligible for agency 
shop fee refunds. 
Barry takes particular exception to the ALJ's statement in 
her decision that "Barry refused to stipulate to the 
aforementioned facts [referring to UUP's allegations of 
notification by newsletter]." He asserts that the ALJ showed 
prejudice by referring to UUP's allegations as facts. Barry 
further complains that the ALJ erred in that she relied on these 
allegations in concluding that UUP had provided reasonable 
notice to unit employees eligible for refunds. 
We reject these arguments. Barry did not contest UUP's 
allegations of fact, but argued that they were irrelevant to his 
contention that nothing less than first-class mail constitutes 
adequate notice. Thus, for the purpose of her decision, the ALJ 
properly assumed the alleged facts to be true. 
Barry also argues that the ALJ erred in holding that the 
notice requirements of the Taylor Law were satisfied by any mail 
delivered by the United States Postal Service. In support of 
his position, he notes that this Board spoke of the need for 
notice by "regular" mail in PEF (Kahn). 15 PERB 1f30ll (1982), 
another agency shop fee case. Also, in Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Trust Co.. 339 U.S. 306 (1950), the U.S. Supreme Court 
required "ordinary" mail for the notification of trust 
beneficiaries whose addresses were known. Barry contends that 
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the terms "regular" mail and "ordinary" mail contemplate 
first-class mail. 
We affirm the determination of the ALJ. These terms 
contemplate any mail delivered by the United State Postal 
Service ordinarily and on a regular basis.— 
In Barry's final exception he objects to the AL J' s refusal 
to rule that UUP has a special obligation to notify eligible 
unit members of its refund procedure because it has been a 
persistent violator of the Taylor Law's agency shop fee 
. . 2/ provisions.— 
We affirm this determination of the ALJ. As indicated, 
mailed notice by other than first-class mail is, ordinarily, 
sufficient under the Taylor Law. In appropriate cases, this 
Board could order an employee organization to use other forms 
of notice. However, such an order would have to be issued as 
part of the remedy in an improper practice case where a 
violation was found. No such order is applicable herein. 
i^The differences between first class mail on the one 
hand, and second or third class mail on the other, are not 
relevant to the certainty or quality of UUP's notice to Barry. 
Those differences merely relate to the speed of the delivery of 
the notice and to its confidentiality. The Postal Service 
being authorized to open and read second and third class mail, 
but not first class mail. 
i/The ALJ rejected this argument on the ground that there 
is no factual basis in the record for such a declaration. 
Barry argues that the Board can make such a declaration on the 
basis of its decisions in various other UUP agency shop fee 
cases. We do not find it necessary to resolve this 
disagreement. 
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NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: October 10. 1984 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
wf^ 
David C. Randies. Memb 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF WARWICK. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2782 
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE. INC., 
Petitioner, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of Police, 
Inc. has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All police officers. 
Excluded: Chief of Police and all other 
employees of the Town. 
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Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Federation of 
Police, Inc. and enter into a written agreement with such 
employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in the above unit, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: October 10, 1984 
Albany, New York 
a>uf>/k Y£^tM^k^===r-
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
David C. Randies. Member 
//3B-10/10/84 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF VESTAL. 
Employer. 
-and- CASE NO. "P-2-815 
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING 
ENGINEERS LOCAL UNION 410, AFL-CIO. 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Union of 
Operating Engineers Local Union 410, AFL-CIO has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and 
described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees of the Highway. 
Water and Sewer, and Parks 
Departments. 
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Excluded: Highway Superintendent, Deputy 
Highway Superintendent, 
Superintendent of Parks 
Department. Superintendent of 
Water and Sewer Department, 
Highway Department Bookkeeper, 
secretarial and recreational 
employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the International Union of 
Operating Engineers Local Union 410. AFL-CIO and enter into a 
written agreement with such employee organization with regard to 
terms and conditions of employment of the employees in the above 
unit, and shall negotiate collectively with such employee 
organization in the determination of. and administration of, 
grievances of such employees. 
DATED: October 10. 1984. 
Albany. New York 
'/>£ sa*a»g*<. 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
&£* 'frWJC^y \&ISL.< 
David C. Randies. Member 
#3C-10/10/84 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF BINGHAMTON. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2771 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 693, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS. 
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
LOCAL UNION 82 6. AFSCME, AFL-CIO. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local Union 693. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs. Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above named employer, in the 
unit described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
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Unit: Included: Park Maintenance Foreman/Park 
Maintenance Supervisor; Signal Foreman; 
Street Maintenance Foreman/Sanitation 
Supervisor; Sanitation Foreman/ 
Sanitation Supervisor; Water Maintenance 
Foreman/Water Distribution Supervisor; 
Sewer Maintenance Foreman/Sanitary 
Sewer Systems Supervisor; General 
Equipment Foreman/Supervisor General 
Equipment; Supervisor of Buildings and 
Shops; and Fleet Equipment Manager/Motor 
Equipment Instructor. 
Excluded: All other employees employed by the 
City of Binghamton. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local Union 693. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs. Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America and enter into a written agreement with 
such employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in the unit found appropriate, and 
shall negotiate collectively with such employee organization in 
the determination of. and administration of. grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: October 10. 1984 
Albany. New York 
'fit^n^&i^^ 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
David C. Randies; Membe, 
